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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following two hypotheticals: 
Elizabeth, an eighteen-year-old high school graduate, applies for 
a cashier position at a prominent national retailer. Following a 
successful interview, she is offered the position and presented with an 
employment contract to sign on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The 
employment agreement includes a waiver of Elizabeth’s right to a 
 
 *  J.D. 2001, New York University School of Law. Mr. Chuang is corporate counsel for an 
international technology company and previously served as law clerk to the Honorable Saundra 
Brown Armstrong, United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The 
author thanks Professor Eric C. Christiansen and Sean C. Beougher for their helpful comments 
and suggestions. 
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jury trial. Elizabeth signs the agreement. Elizabeth works for the 
retailer full-time for five years and in that time is promoted to shift 
supervisor. She notices, however, that all male employees with similar 
performance reviews and seniority have been promoted to store 
managers. Elizabeth strongly believes that she has been denied 
opportunities for promotion on the basis of her gender and decides to 
sue her employer. Elizabeth takes her case to various plaintiff’s 
attorneys but none will take it for fear that her jury trial waiver will 
result in a de minimis recovery. Undaunted, Elizabeth files a lawsuit 
against her employer in pro per. Throughout the litigation, she makes 
critical mistakes due to her legal inexperience. Finally, her employer 
offers her $5,000.00 to settle the matter. Elizabeth accepts the 
settlement. 
Sarah, an eighteen-year-old high school graduate, applies for a 
cashier position at a prominent national grocer. Following a 
successful interview, she is offered the position and presented with an 
employment contract to sign on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The 
employment agreement does not include a waiver of Sarah’s right to a 
jury trial. Sarah signs the agreement. Sarah works for the grocer full-
time for five years and in that time is promoted to shift supervisor. 
She notices, however, that all male employees with similar 
performance reviews and seniority have been promoted to store 
managers. Like Elizabeth, Sarah strongly believes that she has been 
denied opportunities for promotion on the basis of her gender and 
decides to sue her employer. Sarah takes her case to various plaintiff’s 
attorneys. After reviewing the facts of Sarah’s case and weighing the 
likely outcome of a jury trial, a prominent plaintiff’s attorney takes 
her case on contingency. The attorney helps Sarah amass substantial 
evidence of gender discrimination by her employer. Sarah’s attorney 
contacts her employer and threatens to sue. During the subsequent 
negotiations, Sarah’s attorney makes it clear that they are prepared to 
take the case to the jury. Before the suit is even filed, Sarah’s 
employer offers to settle the case for $1,000,000.00, which Sarah 
accepts. 
As exemplified by the foregoing hypotheticals, a jury trial waiver 
can significantly affect the perceived value of a plaintiff’s case. 
Indeed, in 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice found that the 
amount awarded to victorious plaintiffs varied significantly depending 
on whether the case was decided by a jury or a judge.1 The difference 
 
 1. THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
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between the award amounts was particularly striking in employment 
discrimination cases, where victorious plaintiffs were awarded a 
median of $218,000 from juries as compared to only $40,000 from 
judges.2 Not surprisingly, many employers have sought to avoid the 
greater risk inherent in jury trials by requiring their employees to use 
alternate dispute resolution methods such as arbitration.3 But the use 
of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment 
context carries its own distinct disadvantages.4 Accordingly, some 
commentators are advocating for increased use of pre-dispute 
contractual jury waivers as a way to manage employment litigation 
risk.5 
But while jury waivers can be an attractive alternative to 
arbitration on the one hand and jury trials on the other, judicial 
treatment of such waivers has been quite varied.6 Two state supreme 
courts, California and Georgia, have ruled that pre-dispute 
contractual jury waivers are not enforceable.7 Those jurisdictions that 
permit such waivers use a wide array of “safeguards not typical of 
 
STATISTICS BULLETIN: CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 2001: CIVIL TRIAL CASES 
AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, AT 5-6 (Apr. 2004), available at <http://www.ojp. 
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctcvlc01.pdf>. 
 2. Id. at 6. The survey found that the median amount awarded to plaintiff winners in 
federal district courts was also higher in jury trial cases than in bench trial cases. Id. at 7. 
Although the survey did not specify the median award amount in federal employment 
discrimination cases, it found that the median award in federal jury trial cases involving 
“contract,” a category which included employment discrimination cases, was $330,000 as 
compared to only $226,000 in bench trial cases. Id. at 7, 10-11. 
 3. See, e.g., Dianne LaRocca, The Bench Trial: A More Beneficial Alternative to Arbitra- 
tion of Title VII Claims, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 934 (2005); Michael H. LeRoy, Jury Revival 
or Jury Reviled? When Employees are Compelled to Waiver Jury Trials, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 767, 768-70 (2005). 
 4. See infra, Part II.B. 
 5. See, e.g., Harold M. Brody & Anthony J. Oncidi, Careful What You Wish For: Is 
Arbitration the Employer’s Panacea? Perhaps There is a Better Alternative, 9 HR ADVISOR: 
LEGAL & PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 7 (noting that jury trial waivers, as 
opposed to arbitration, are a “better way to shield employers from the risk and expense 
associated with jury trials”); Samuel Estreicher & Rene M. Johnson, Contractual Jury Trial 
Waivers in Federal Employment Litigation, N.Y.L.J., May 2, 2003, at 3 (noting that 
“practitioners are increasingly considering contractual jury trial waivers”); LaRocca, supra note 
3, at 954-59 (arguing that jury trial waivers allow employers and employees to avoid the 
disadvantages of arbitration); Chad Shultz, The Jury’s Still Out – Way Out: Subtracting the Jury 
From the Equation Decreases Uncertainty in Employment Cases, 50 HR MAG., Jan. 2005, at 97 
(suggesting that employers use jury waivers in lieu of arbitration). 
 6. See infra, Part III.B & C. 
 7. See Grafton Partners L.P. v. Super. Ct., 116 P.3d 479, 488 (Cal. 2005) (holding that state 
statute does not authorize pre-dispute waiver of the right to jury trial); Bank South N.A. v. 
Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. 1994) (holding that neither the Georgia constitution nor state 
statute provide for pre-litigation contractual waivers of jury trial). 
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commercial law”8 to protect the constitutional right to jury trial. The 
multiple safeguards used by courts, and the different ways of applying 
them led the California Supreme Court to note “the difficulties 
experienced in other jurisdictions [with respect to pre-dispute jury 
waivers], where disagreements persist concerning such matters as 
allocation of the burden of proof when a party resists enforcement of 
a contractual waiver of jury trial.”9 These disagreements must be 
settled before such waivers can be used appropriately and effectively. 
This Article resolves the burden of proof question by arguing 
that several factors support assigning the burden of proof to the party 
seeking enforcement of the waiver, which in employer-employee 
disputes will usually be the employer. Allocating the proof burden in 
this way will standardize judicial treatment of pre-dispute jury 
waivers, allowing them to be used optimally to manage the risks of 
dispute resolution. 
Part II of this Article assesses the use of pre-dispute jury waivers 
in the employment context and explains their appeal. Part III 
analyzes the various ways that federal courts have treated pre-dispute 
jury waivers and notes specific inconsistencies in the treatment of 
such waivers in several recent federal employment cases. Part IV 
argues that in the employment context, public policy considerations, 
and convenience and fairness concerns, all call for assigning the 
burden of proof to the party seeking enforcement of the waiver. 
II. PRE-DISPUTE CONTRACTUAL JURY WAIVERS 
The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes a 
constitutional right to a jury trial in legal actions in federal court, 
including diversity jurisdiction cases.10 In addition, federal 
employment law statutes such as Title VII11 and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)12 grant jury trial rights.13 
 
 8. Grafton Partners, 116 P.3d at 491 & n.12. For a more extensive discussion of the 
safeguards used by courts, see infra, note 57 & accompanying text. 
 9. Grafton Partners, 116 P.3d at 492; see also Shultz, supra note 5 (“It is safe to assume 
that lawyers who represent employees will challenge the validity of jury waiver agreements.”); 
Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that there is “little guidance” regarding “whether, 
when and how an employer may implement a jury trial waiver program”). For a more extensive 
discussion of the disagreements between various jurisdictions, see infra, Part III.B. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). 
 12. U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). 
 13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (2006) (amending Title VII to permit jury trials); 29 U.S.C. § 
626(c)(2) (2000) (granting jury trial rights under the ADEA). 
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From a risk management perspective, however, many employers find 
a jury’s legendary unpredictability to be unacceptable.14 
A. The Problem with Juries 
Most employers believe that juries are more likely than judges to 
find against wealthy or corporate defendants and more likely than 
judges to award large damages to victorious plaintiffs.15 Furthermore, 
according to prevailing wisdom, juries generally “favor the little guy 
against the big one, the simpler case rather than the one more 
difficult to understand, local interests rather than those situated 
farther away, emotional appeals to right versus wrong rather than 
strict application of the law and more attractive witnesses rather than 
those lacking a cordial appearance.”16 These concerns have motivated 
many employers to adopt alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
to handle employment disputes. 
A substantial number of employers currently use arbitration.17 By 
submitting disputes to an arbitrator rather than to a jury, both 
employers and employees expect reduced costs, faster resolutions, 
greater privacy and increased predictability.18 But recently, numerous 
concerns have been raised regarding the continued use of arbitrators 
in employment disputes. 
B. The Problem with Arbitration 
Critics of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements argue 
that by providing a private, less costly way for employees to bring 
 
 14. Robert S. Blumberg & Ariel D. Weindling, A|S|A|P, A Littler Mendelson Time 
Sensitive Newsletter, California Edition (Aug. 2005), available at, <http://www.littler.com/ 
presspublications/index.cfm?event=pubItem&pubItemID=12181&childViewID=250&type=all> 
(“Among the greatest fears of many employers is the chance that a runaway jury could impose a 
potentially ruinous verdict in a wrongful discharge or harassment matter.”); see Shultz, supra 
note 5 (“Jury trials . . . are notoriously unpredictable. . . . mak[ing] it difficult to assess the 
wisdom of a decision to continue or settle.”). 
 15. See Jerry Custis, LITIGATION MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, § 8:32 (2004). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that a “substantial number” of 
employers “employing millions of employees” have adopted arbitration); LaRocca, supra note 
3, at 933-34 (writing that in 1997, 19 percent of private sector employers were using arbitration 
and that in 2001, six million employees were covered by employment arbitration plans 
administered by the American Arbitration Association); Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, 
Judicial Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 249, 252 (2003) (“The substitution of mandatory arbitration for discrimination 
lawsuits is the most significant employment law development since the early 1990s.”). 
 18. LaRocca, supra note 3, at 935-37. 
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discrimination claims, such agreements expose employers to a greater 
number of discrimination claims.19 Employers are also finding that 
arbitration does not offer a significant improvement over litigation in 
terms of time and costs saved. Experience has shown that resolution 
times for disputes that are arbitrated are not significantly faster than 
disputes that are litigated in court.20 Moreover, arbitrators typically do 
not grant summary judgment, further prolonging the case and 
increasing costs.21 Arbitration costs also include fees for preparing and 
conducting the arbitration, and deciding discovery disputes and law 
and motion proceedings – all costs which are publicly funded in a 
court proceeding.22 This is a particular burden on employers as they 
are often saddled with the entire cost of the arbitration.23 
Arbitrating a dispute also requires both employers and 
employees to accept procedures that may differ from those provided 
by statute, as well as limited judicial recourse in the event of an 
adverse outcome.24 There is also continuing debate in the courts, as 
well as among commentators, regarding the judicial enforceability of 
mandatory arbitration agreements.25  All of these problems with 
 
 19. See id at 938-42; Shultz, supra note 5 (writing that arbitration may encourage claims). 
 20. See Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7. 
 21. See id. (stating that arbitration is often not much faster than, and can be as expensive 
as, court litigation, that arbitrators rarely grant motions for summary judgment and that 
arbitrators often “split-the-baby” and issue compromise awards); Shultz, supra note 5 (writing 
that arbitrators “seldom dismiss cases without a hearing, even when there is no arguable basis 
for a claim”). 
 22. See LaRocca, supra note 3, at 939. 
 23. See Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that plaintiff’s attorneys often do not 
oppose arbitration because they can litigate “largely at the employer’s expense”). 
 24. See LaRocca, supra note 3, at 940; LeRoy, supra note 3, at 777-80 (noting that the use 
of arbitrators as adjudicators of employment disputes is now questioned due to, inter alia, high 
damages awards and extremely deferential standard of judicial review). 
 25. See Leroy & Feuille, supra note 17, at 313-26 (noting “surprising evidence of judicial 
resistance to these mandatory [arbitration] arrangements.”). Much has been written regarding 
how mandatory arbitration agreements should be enforced, if at all. See generally Jean R. 
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a 
Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 676 (2001) (arguing that the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial should limit the ability of parties to impose binding arbitration). 
Some argue that a knowing and voluntary standard of consent should be applied to pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration agreements. See id.; Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and 
Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of 
Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (2002); but see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, 
Jury-Waiver Clauses, and other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 167, 168 (arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act 
cannot “plausibly be interpreted to require knowing consent or any other standards of consent 
except those used by contract law”). Still others argue that it is inequitable to enforce executory 
agreements to arbitrate between employers and employees. See generally, Sarah Rudolph Cole, 
Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements 
Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. Rev. 449, 450-54 (1996). 
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arbitration have spurred many employers to reconsider the use of 
arbitration to resolve employment disputes.26 
C. Are Pre-Dispute Jury Waivers The Solution? 
“EACH OF THE PARTIES HERETO IRREVOCABLY 
WAIVES ALL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY 
ACTION, PROCEEDING OR COUNTERCLAIM ARISING 
OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT.”27 
Pre-dispute contractual jury waivers such as the one quoted 
above, are increasingly being used by employers as an alternative way 
to mitigate risk.28 Such waivers offer some of the benefits of both 
arbitration and jury trials. Like a jury trial, a bench trial allows parties 
to take full advantage of our court system because it provides litigants 
with procedural and evidentiary protections that may not otherwise 
be available in arbitration.29 Judges are generally more receptive to 
dispositive motions than are arbitrators.30 Court proceedings also 
permit greater post-judgment judicial review than is available 
following an arbitration award.31 
Much like arbitration, bench trials offer potentially significant 
time and cost savings when compared to jury trials.  This is because 
bench trials are generally concluded much faster than jury trials.32 In 
addition, in a bench trial, parties are spared the costs of selecting a 
jury, tailoring the case to a jury, and settling jury instructions.33 
 
 26. See Ryan Griffitts, Jury Waiver Agreements Revisited, THOMPSON COE LAB. & EMP. 
NEWS, Spring 2005, at 2, available at <http://www.thompsoncoe.com/Portals/0/LEN-06-02.pdf> 
(law firm newsletter noting more employers are using jury waivers in their employment 
agreements). 
 27. This pre-dispute jury waiver is reproduced from an actual employment agreement that 
was litigated in federal court. Morris v. McFarland Clinic P.C., No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004 
WL 306110, at *1 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 29, 2004) (emphasis original). 
 28. See Blumberg & Weindling, supra note 14 (stating that many employers use pre dispute 
jury waivers to avoid “the great uncertainty which comes with jury trial, while both avoiding the 
cost of arbitration and retaining the right to appeal”); LeRoy, supra note 3, at 769 (noting some 
employers are discarding arbitration in favor of jury waivers); see also Shultz, supra note 5 
(writing that a jury waiver diminishes the value of a plaintiff’s case). 
 29. See LaRocca, supra note 3, at 955 (“Because a judge is bound by Title VII and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, employees [and employers] are guaranteed appropriate 
statutes of limitations, unbiased selection of the decision maker, appropriate cost allocations, 
judicial expertise, full appellate rights, appropriate punitive damages, and appropriate 
remedies.”). 
 30. See Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7. 
 31. See Estreicher & Johnson, supra note 5, at 1. 
 32. See Cohen & Smith, supra note 1, at tbls. 2 & 8 (stating that 77 percent  of non-jury 
cases were decided within two years as compared to only 56.9 percent of jury cases, and that 
jury trials lasted an average of 4.3 days compared to only 1.9 days for bench trials). 
 33. See Custis, supra note 15, at § 8:32. 
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Finally, submitting a dispute to a judge rather than a jury minimizes 
employers’ fears of excessive jury awards.34 
In certain situations, a pre-dispute contractual jury waiver can 
offer clear advantages to the employer,35 and serve as “an attractive 
middle ground between jury trials, on the one hand, and arbitration, 
on the other.”36 But as use of such waivers has increased, serious 
questions have arisen regarding their treatment in the courts.37 Part 
III of this Article examines the disparate ways federal courts, and in 
particular federal courts adjudicating employment disputes,38 have 
analyzed pre-dispute contractual jury waivers. 
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PRE-DISPUTE JURY WAIVERS 
The right to a trial by jury in a civil lawsuit may be waived by a 
prior written agreement.39 Federal courts examining pre-dispute jury 
 
 34. See Grafton Partners L.P. v. Super. Ct., 116 P.3d 479, 493 (Cal. 2005) (Chin, J. 
concurring). 
 35. If the choice is between a bench trial and arbitration, the additional procedural and 
evidentiary protections afforded by a bench trial can also be beneficial to the employee. If the 
choice is between a bench trial and a jury trial, however, few employees are likely to choose the 
bench trial because from the employee’s perspective, the cost and time savings afforded by a 
bench trial are minor considerations, since most cases are taken on a contingency basis. See 
David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the 
Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. 
& EMP. L. 73, 89 (1999) (noting that few employee-plaintiffs can afford attorneys and most 
retain them on a contingency basis). Moreover, the potential cost savings must be weighed 
against the perception that juries are more likely than judges to find for employee-plaintiffs. See 
supra Part II.A. 
 36. Grafton Partners v. Super. Ct., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 519 n.10 (Cal. App. 2004), 
depublished by, 88 P.3d 204 (Cal. 2004), aff’d and superseded by, 116 P.3d 479 (Cal. 2005) 
(“Agreements to resolve future disputes by court trial may alleviate fears of excessive jury 
awards while providing greater procedural protections than arbitration in many respects, 
including discovery, securing an impartial factfinder, and appeal, among others. It is noteworthy 
that the reduction of such rights in the arbitral forum, as well as the unique costs imposed by 
arbitration, have troubled California courts.”). 
 37. See infra Part III. 
 38. This Article limits its scope to federal employment cases because federal statutes and 
federal employment claims make up a prominent portion of the body of employment law and 
most plaintiffs with both federal and state employment claims will end up litigating their claims 
in a federal court. See Michael D. Moberly, Proceeding Geometrically: Rethinking Parallel State 
and Federal Employment Discrimination Litigation, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 499, 502-03 (1997) 
(writing that “individuals who pursue their state and federal rights in the same proceeding may 
be required to litigate those rights in a federal forum, because an employer against whom both 
state and federal claims are brought in state court ordinarily can remove the entire action to 
federal court”); Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment 
on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 664 n.69 (1994) (noting employers routinely remove 
employment discrimination cases filed in state court to federal court). 
 39. See, e.g., Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(“Agreements waiving the right to trial by jury are neither illegal nor contrary to public 
policy,”); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1985) (“It is clear that the 
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waivers have overwhelmingly applied the knowing and voluntary 
consent standard to such waivers.40 But critically, the courts have not 
agreed whether the party seeking to enforce or the party seeking to 
avoid the waiver should bear the burden of proof that the waiver was 
entered into knowingly and voluntarily.41 
This Part reviews judicial treatment of contractual jury waivers 
and discusses several recent federal district court cases that 
confronted such waivers in the context of an employer-employee 
dispute. 
A. Knowing Consent Requirement 
Prior to the 1970s, most courts examined contractual jury waivers 
using contract law standards of consent.42 As stated by Professor 
Stephen J. Ware: 
Under contract law’s objective standards of consent, signing (or 
otherwise manifesting assent to) such a document is, with few 
exceptions, consent to the terms on the document. The signature’s 
“blanket assent” is good enough. Neither reading nor 
understanding the terms is necessary to make those terms 
enforceable.43 
In 1977, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit became one 
of the first courts to articulate a knowing-consent requirement in the 
context of contractual jury waivers.44 In National Equipment Rental, 
Ltd. v. Hendrix,45 H. Walter Hendrix, III (“Hendrix”) purchased a 
tractor-scraper and a bulldozer from two separate dealers that he was 
 
parties to a contract may by prior written agreement waive the right to jury trial.”); Cooperative 
Finance Ass’n., Inc. v. Garst, 871 F.Supp. 1168, 1171 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (collecting cases). 
 40. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 756 (citing, National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. 
Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.1977)); Schappert v. Bedford, Freeman & Worth Publ’g 
Group, LLC, No. 03 Civ. 0058 (RMB), 2004 WL 1661073, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2004) 
(citing, Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 603 (S.D.N.Y.1999)); Morris v. 
McFarland Clinic, P.C., No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004 WL 306110, at *1 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 
29,2004) (citing, Coop. Fin. Ass’n., Inc. v. Garst, 871 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (N.D. Iowa 1995)); N. 
Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y.1983); Dreiling 
v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F.Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982). 
 41. Grafton Partners L.P. v. Super. Ct., 116 P.3d 479, 491 n.12 (Cal. 2005); see Med. Air 
Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The circuits are currently split 
on the question of which party bears the burden of proof as to whether a contractual jury trial 
waiver was knowing and voluntary.”). 
 42. Ware, supra note 25, at 201-02; Deborah J. Matties, Note, A Case for Judicial Self-
Restraint in Interpreting Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Court, 65 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 431, 444-47 (1997). 
 43. Ware, supra note 25, at 171. 
 44. Id. at 202. 
 45. 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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subsequently unable to pay for.46 Hendrix approached National 
Equipment Rental, Ltd. (“NER”) for a loan to settle his accounts 
with the two dealers.47 The loan agreements were characterized by 
NER as “equipment leases.”48 Hendrix eventually defaulted and NER 
seized the tractor-scraper and the bulldozer.49 NER sold the 
equipment and sued Hendrix to collect the remaining balance due on 
the two leases.50 A jury found that the lease agreements were actually 
usurious loan agreements, void under New York State law.51 NER 
appealed, claiming, inter alia, that Hendrix was improperly granted a 
jury trial in the face of a contractual clause in the leases waiving such 
a right.52 Affirming the trial court’s decision to grant Hendrix’s 
demand for a jury trial despite having signed a contractual pre-
dispute jury waiver, the Second Circuit reasoned, “It is elementary 
that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury is fundamental and that 
its protection can only be relinquished knowingly and intentionally. 
Indeed, a presumption exists against its waiver.”53 
 
 46. Id. at 256. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 257. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 258 (citations omitted). There is considerable scholarship discussing whether the 
knowing consent standard established in Hendrix was adequately supported by precedent. First, 
the Hendrix court failed to acknowledge that it relied on a criminal case involving jury waiver 
(where courts have long applied higher consent standards for constitutional waivers) and a case 
involving an attorney’s oral waiver during a pretrial conference (as distinguished from a pre-
dispute contractual waiver) for this standard. See Matties, supra note 42, at 446-47; Ware, supra 
note 25, at 203. Second, while the Hendrix court acknowledged that the Supreme Court upheld 
the contractual waiver of the right to personal service without employing a knowing consent 
standard in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), the court 
distinguished Szukhent by stating that “the right to a jury trial . . . is far more fundamental than 
the right to personal service, and cannot be waived absent a showing that its relinquishment is 
knowing and intentional.” 565 F.2d at 258 n.1. Curiously, the Hendrix court provided no 
authority or reasoning for such a statement or to explain “why the standard for civil waivers of 
constitutional rights should differ when the right is found in the Seventh Amendment as 
opposed to the Due Process Clause.” Ware, supra note 25, at 203; see Matties, supra note 42, at 
447. Indeed, Professor Ware argues that “Hendrix was already out of step with the Supreme 
Court when it was decided in 1977, and it is now farther out of step with a modern Supreme 
Court.” Ware, supra note 25, at 203; but see Matties, supra note 42, at 447 (arguing that despite 
its flaws in reasoning, Hendrix correctly recognized the importance of the civil jury in federal 
court); Sternlight, supra note 25, at 677-80 (arguing that contractual waivers of jury trial rights 
are permissible only when the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intentional and identifying 
Hendrix as a “leading case”). 
  Given that “lower courts have virtually uniformly held that such waivers are only valid 
when they meet a [knowing consent] standard,” id. at 679, this Article focuses on clarifying the 
allocation of the burden of proof when a party resists enforcement of a jury waiver and does not 
address whether the knowing consent standard is the correct standard. 
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The Hendrix court found that the jury waiver clause at issue 
“fail[ed] to overcome this presumption. . . . [because it] was set deeply 
and inconspicuously in the contract.”54 The court further found that 
the waiver was neither knowing nor intentional in light of the “gross 
inequality in bargaining power” between the parties, given that 
Hendrix “did not have any choice but to accept the . . . contract as 
written if he was to get badly needed funds.”55 
After Hendrix, courts have consistently applied the knowing 
consent standard to jury waivers, characterizing it using such words as 
“knowing,” “voluntary” and/or “intentional.”56 As Professor Jean R.  
Sternlight observes: 
While courts have not adopted an identical phrasing of the factors 
to be considered in examining contractual jury trial waivers, there is 
substantial agreement regarding what kinds of information is 
relevant. Courts typically consider any actual negotiations over the 
clause, whether the clause was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis, the conspicuousness of the waiver, the degree of bargaining 
disparity between the parties, and the experience and sophistication 
of the party opposing the waiver. Courts have not been explicit as 
to how these factors relate to one another, but seem to consider 
them all together.57 
B. Allocation of the Burden of Proof 58 
While courts may agree on the types of information relevant to 
the knowing and voluntary consent inquiry, many have failed to 
address “the important question” of which party bears the burden of 
proving that the waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.59 
 
 54. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Sternlight, supra note 25, at 678-79 (observing that courts use different combinations of 
knowing, voluntary and intentional to describe the standard). 
 57. Id. at 680. Professor Sternlight provides a detailed discussion of the information courts 
typically find most relevant: (1) negotiability of the waiver; (2) conspicuousness of the waiver; 
(3) disparity of bargaining power between the parties; and (4) business or professional 
experience and sophistication of the party opposing the waiver. See id. at 681-90. 
 58. The Supreme Court recently observed that “[t]he term ‘burden of proof’ is one of the 
‘slipperiest member[s] of the family of legal terms.’” Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 533 (Nov. 
14, 2005) (citing 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §342, at 433 (John William Strong ed., 5th ed. 
1999)). This is because the term “encompasses two separate burdens of proof. One burden is 
that of producing evidence, satisfactory to the judge, of a particular fact in issue. The second is 
the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true.” 2 MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 336; see Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 533-34 (citing Dir., Off. Workers’ Comp. Progs. v. 
Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994)). However, the term “burden of proof” is now 
generally limited to the burden of persuasion. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 272-76. 
 59. Sternlight, supra note 25, at 691; see, e.g., Allyn v. Western United Life Assur. Co., 347 
F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1251-52 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (noting that Eleventh Circuit had not resolved the 
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While some district courts have placed the burden of proof on the 
party seeking enforcement of the waiver,60 two circuits have expressly 
split over the issue,61 and most other appellate courts have declined to 
resolve the question.62 
The confusion surrounding the allocation of the burden of proof 
may stem from the Hendrix court’s failure to elaborate on the origin 
of this presumption or explain how it was to be applied. As support 
for its “presumption” the Hendrix court merely cited to Aetna 
Insurance Co. v. Kennedy.63 But while the Supreme Court did state in 
Aetna that “as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts indulge 
every reasonable presumption against waiver,”64 Aetna involved a jury 
waiver during litigation and not a pre-dispute contractual jury 
waiver.65 As discussed infra, this is an important distinction that 
makes it difficult to analogize the reasoning in Aetna to cases 
 
burden question and declining to address it). 
 60. See, e.g., Morris v. McFarland Clinic P.C., No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004 WL 306110, at 
*1 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 29, 2004); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 
2002); Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F .Supp. 15, 18 (D.P.R. 1996); Dreiling v. Peugeot 
Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo.1982). 
 61. Compare Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that 
“the party seeking enforcement of the [jury] waiver must prove that consent was both voluntary 
and informed”), with, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir.1985) (holding 
that “in the context of an express contractual [jury] waiver the objecting party should have the 
burden of demonstrating that its consent to the provisions was not knowing and voluntary”). 
 62. See, e.g., Med. Air Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2002); 
Pierce v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 110 F.3d 431, 435 n.4 (7th Cir.1997); Hulsey v. 
West, 966 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir.1992). 
 63. 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937). 
 64. Id. at 393. 
 65. The parties in Aetna, after introducing their evidence at trial and agreeing upon the 
amount of loss, each submitted requests for peremptory jury instructions and for a directed 
verdict in their respective favor. Id. at 392. The trial court refused to direct for either party and 
submitted the case to the jury. Id. The jury found for defendants and plaintiff appealed. Id. The 
appeals court found, inter alia, that “by their requests for peremptory instructions, plaintiff and 
defendants assumed the facts to be undisputed and submitted to the trial judge the 
determination of the inferences to be drawn from the evidence and so took the cases from the 
jury.” Id. The appeals court further held that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain verdicts 
for defendants and remanded the cases to the trial court with directions to give plaintiff 
judgment for the agreed amount of the loss. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning: 
The established rule is that where plaintiff and defendant respectively request 
peremptory instructions, and do nothing more, they thereby assume the facts to be 
undisputed and in effect submit to the trial judge the determination of the inferences 
properly to be drawn from them . . . But, as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts 
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. . . . Here neither the plaintiff nor 
the defendants applied for directed verdicts without more. With their requests for 
peremptory instructions they submitted other requests that reasonably may be held to 
amount to applications that, if a peremptory instruction is not given, the cases be 
submitted to the jury. Indeed, we find nothing in the record to support the view that 
the parties waived their right of trial by jury or authorized the judge to decide any issue 
of fact. 
Id. at 393-94 (emphasis added). 
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involving pre-dispute contractual jury waivers.66 
Those courts that have resolved the burden of proof question 
merely follow the pronouncements of Hendrix and Aetna without 
thorough analysis.67 Some courts place the burden on the party 
seeking to avoid the waiver clause to preserve society’s interest in 
freedom of contract.68 Those courts that assign the burden to the party 
seeking to enforce the waiver contend that the interest in preserving 
freedom of contract is outweighed by society’s “greater interest in 
guarding the fundamental right to a jury.”69 The following 
examination of several recent employment cases that confronted pre-
dispute jury waivers highlights this disagreement. 
C. Review of Case Law Reveals Inconsistent Treatment of Waivers 
I have found three federal opinions discussing employee 
challenges to pre-dispute contractual jury waivers, all decided within 
the last several years.70  Although this sample is small, given that the 
use of such waivers in the employment context is relatively new,71 and 
given the number of employment lawyers that are encouraging their 
 
 66. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text. 
 67. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir.1986) (placing burden 
on party seeking enforcement of waiver and citing Hendrix but failing to distinguish the Sixth 
Circuit’s contrary holding in K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755-56 (6th 
Cir.1985)); Morris v. McFarland Clinic P.C., No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004 WL 306110, at *1 
(S.D. Jan. 29, Iowa 2004) (concluding that party seeking enforcement of waiver has burden 
without analysis); Schappert v. Bedford, Freeman & Worth Publ’g Group, LLC, No. 03 Civ. 
0058 (RMB), 2004 WL 1661073, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2004) (same); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. 
Powell 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (same); N. Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker 
Motors Corp., 572 F .Supp. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (same). 
 68. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 758. 
 69. Hydramar, Inc. v. General Dynamics Corp., Civ. A. No.85-1788, 1989 WL 159267, at *2 
(E.D. Pa. 1989). 
 70. There is a fourth case, Hammaker v. Brown & Brown, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. 
Va. 2002), that addresses pre-dispute jury waivers in the context of an ADEA claim. Although 
the employment agreement that plaintiff signed in Hammaker contained a jury waiver, the court 
found that the waiver did not conform to the requirements imposed by the Older Workers 
Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA). Id. at 581. In finding that the OWBPA’s waiver 
requirements apply to procedural rights, such as the right to a jury trial, the court declined to 
follow several circuit court holdings to the contrary. Id. at 579-80. As of the date of this Article, 
no court has followed Hammaker’s lead and one district court has specifically declined to do so. 
See Schappert, No. 03 Civ. 0058 (RMB), 2004 WL 1661073, at *10; see also Browning v. 24 Hour 
Fitness, Inc., No. C05-5152RB, 2006 WL 151933 at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2006). Of more 
relevance to this Article, the Hammaker court also did not address the burden of proof question 
because it was undisputed that the waiver provision at issue did not conform to the OWBPA’s 
requirements. See Hammaker, 214 F. Supp. at 579. 
 71. See LeRoy, supra note 3, at 788-90 (noting that the small number of cases dealing with 
employee challenges to mandatory jury waivers “underestimates the prevalence of jury waivers” 
and may be just “the tip of a larger iceberg”). 
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clients to use them,72 litigation over such waivers is sure to increase. In 
the meantime, an examination of these three initial cases suggests that 
employers should tread carefully as judicial treatment of such waivers 
has been unpredictable. 
In Brown v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc.,73 a terminated employee 
sued her employer for breach of employment contract and 
discrimination on the basis of “sex, pregnancy and childbirth” in 
violation of Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and 
the New York City Human Rights Law.74 A magistrate judge 
determined that plaintiff’s employment agreement, which provided, 
in part that, “[Employer] and Employee shall and hereby do waive a 
trial by jury in any action, proceeding or counter-claim brought or 
asserted by either of the parties hereto against the other on any 
matters whatsoever arising out of this Agreement” was a “‘contractual 
waiver of a jury trial [that] applies to all of [Plaintiff’s] claims, 
including those arising under federal and state discrimination 
statutes.’”75 
The district court judge accepted the magistrate’s finding, noting 
that “[j]ury trial waivers are enforced if they are knowing and 
voluntary.”76 First, the court found that the jury waiver was a 
conspicuous part of plaintiff’s employment agreement. Second, given 
that plaintiff had an M.B.A. from Harvard and had previously 
worked as an investment banker, the court found that she could 
“have negotiated about the clause if she tried.”77 The court rejected 
plaintiff’s argument that she did not read the employment agreement 
before signing it as having “no merit,” citing authority that absent 
fraud, duress, or some other wrongful act, a party is bound by the 
contracts she signs whether or not the party has read the contract.78 
The Brown court did not explicitly address the proper allocation 
 
 72. See, e.g., Griffitts, supra note 26, at 2 (law firm newsletter noting more employers are 
using jury waivers in their employment agreements); see also MORSE, BARNES-BROWN & 
PENDLETON, P.C., EMPLOYMENT LAW ADVISOR, Apr. 2004, available at <http://www.mbbp. 
com/practices/employment/ela/ela%200404%20-%20offer%20letters.pdf> (law firm newsletter 
encouraging employers to consider using jury waivers); Mark N. Reinharz & Terence M. 
O’Neil, Jury Waivers: An Alternative to Arbitration, THE NASSAU LAWYER (Oct. 2002), 
available at <http://www.nassaubar.org/newsletter_article.cfm?ArticleID=79> (partners at the 
law firm of Rains & Pogrebin, P.C. encouraging employers to consider using jury waivers). 
 73. 235 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 74. Id. at 292. 
 75. Id. at 293 (emphasis in original). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 294. 
 78. Id. 
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of the burden of proof. However, the Brown court’s treatment of the 
waiver in question suggests that it placed the burden of proof on the 
plaintiff. First, the court provided no support for its finding that the 
waiver was conspicuous.79 Second, although the plaintiff was highly 
educated and had worked as an investment banker, it does not 
necessarily follow that the clause was negotiable. The court failed to 
cite any evidence of negotiability.80  There was also no evidence in the 
record that the plaintiff was represented by counsel during the 
formation of the agreement.81 The court’s ruling against the plaintiff 
despite these omissions,82 coupled with the court’s reliance on 
authority regarding consent to the unknown,83 suggest that it was 
placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff. By doing so, the Brown 
court was able to uphold the waiver despite the paucity of evidence 
showing knowing and voluntary consent to such a waiver. 
In Morris v. McFarland Clinic P.C.,84 plaintiff neurosurgeon was 
hired as Director of Neurological Surgery by defendant clinic.85 The 
contract required plaintiff to obtain an Iowa medical license and 
plaintiff claimed the clinic’s medical director represented to her that 
he had influence with the Iowa Board of Medical Examiners which 
would enable her to obtain her license within a few weeks.86 Plaintiff 
was subsequently unable to obtain her license and sued the clinic for, 
inter alia, fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract.87 
Although Plaintiff demanded a jury trial, the court found that she had 
 
 79. Compare Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 603 
(S.D.N.Y.1999) (finding a conspicuous jury waiver when it was written in all capital letters in the 
sole paragraph on the signature page itself, it was the last sentence in that paragraph, and it 
immediately preceded the parties’ signatures); see also Sternlight, supra note 25, at 684-86 (“At 
a minimum, courts usually look to see that the typeface was not particularly small, and that the 
clause was not buried in a long agreement.”). 
 80. Compare Sternlight, supra note 25, at 681-82 (noting that courts examine “both any 
negotiations that did take place regarding the clause, and also whether or not the clause was 
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis”). 
 81. Compare id. at 689 (observing that “numerous courts have . . . voided waivers imposed 
on experienced business persons, particularly where the business person was not represented by 
an attorney”). 
 82. See Dir., Off. Workers’ Comp. Progs. v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994) 
(noting that burden of proof refers to “the notion that if the evidence is evenly balanced, the 
party that bears the burden of [proof] must lose”). 
 83. See Ware, supra note 25, at 174 (stating that “a knowing-consent standard would 
generally depart from contract law’s norm of consent to the unknown – that is the usual practice 
of finding consent to form-contract terms about which one party is ignorant”). 
 84. No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004 WL 306110 (S.D.Iowa Jan. 29, 2004). 
 85. Id. at *1. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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voluntarily and knowingly waived her right.88 
The court began by finding, with little analysis, that “the burden 
of demonstrating a voluntary and knowing waiver is on the proponent 
of the waiver.”89 The court then meticulously examined the formation 
of the agreement. The court found evidence of negotiability given 
that: (1) the contract did not have the appearance of a standardized, 
take-it-or-leave it contract; (2) it was undisputed that plaintiff had 
actually negotiated changes in provisions of interest to her; and (3) 
there was evidence showing that plaintiff was “quite happy” with the 
contract.90 The court found that there was relative parity in bargaining 
power given plaintiff’s specialized qualifications and the clinic’s 
specific needs for someone with her qualifications.91 Observing that 
the waiver was on the fifth page of a six page agreement, that it was in 
all upper case letters, and set out in a separately numbered 
paragraph, the court found it to be conspicuous.92 With respect to 
plaintiff’s business acumen, the court found that she was well-
educated and specifically noted that she was the contract negotiations 
manager at her prior clinic.93 Carefully considering all of these factors, 
the court found that defendants had met their burden and 
demonstrated that plaintiff had voluntarily and knowingly agreed to 
waive her right to trial by jury.94 
 
 88. Id. at *4. 
 89. Id. at *1. 
 90. Id. at *2. 
 91. Id. at *3. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. Although plaintiff also argued that she did not have the opportunity to discuss the 
agreement with a lawyer, after reviewing the evidence surrounding the formation of the contract 
and noting that plaintiff never sought more time to review the contract, the court discounted 
this argument.  Id. at *4. 
 94. Id. at *4. It is noteworthy that the court made this finding with some reluctance. Id. at 
*5 (“Given the importance of the jury in the history and fabric of our society, the diminishing 
number of civil jury trials in recent years in our district and in the state courts of Iowa is a trend 
this Court is not at all anxious to encourage. However, the right to jury trial clearly may be 
waived and there are many legitimate reasons why parties may wish to do so. Parties are free to 
enter into agreements as to how they will resolve disputes that may arise in a business or 
professional relationship. When they have voluntarily and knowingly elected to give up the right 
to trial by jury it is incumbent on a court to enforce the agreement just as it would be to enforce 
the right to trial by jury in the absence of such an agreement.”). 
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In Schappert v. Bedford, Freeman & Worth Pub. Group, LLC,95 
plaintiff filed suit against her prior employer alleging that she had 
been wrongly removed from her position on the basis of her age and 
gender.96 Defendants moved to strike plaintiff’s jury demand.97 
The court first noted that the “burden of demonstrating a 
plaintiff has waived her right to a jury trial is on the defendant.”98 
Like the court in Morris, the Schappert court then proceeded to 
carefully apply the knowing consent standard. 
The court found that the terms were negotiable given plaintiff’s 
admission that the agreement had been negotiated and amended to 
reflect changes made to the financial terms.99 The court found 
evidence that the waiver provision was conspicuous.100 With respect to 
bargaining power, the court stated that the fact that plaintiff 
negotiated material terms of the agreement belied her argument that 
there was a gross inequality in bargaining power.101 Plaintiff also did 
not point to any material negative consequences of not signing the 
agreement and did not deny that she could have retained her job 
without signing the agreement, further demonstrating her bargaining 
power.102 Finally, plaintiff herself testified that she was a “smart,” 
“savvy,” “well educated,” and “experienced” business person and 
that she had over two years to have the provision reviewed by her 
attorneys.103 Given all these facts, the court found that defendants had 
met their burden of showing that plaintiff had knowingly and 
voluntarily waived her right to a jury trial.104 
Initially, it should be noted that all the employee-plaintiffs in 
these cases were highly educated and the employee-plaintiffs in 
Morris and Schappert were found to have wielded significant 
bargaining power. As discussed in Part IV.B, this is very unusual. 
Accordingly, these cases should not be relied upon for the general 
proposition that pre-dispute jury waivers in employment agreements 
are enforceable. Indeed, when the employee is unsophisticated and 
 
 95. No. 03 Civ. 0058(RMB), 2004 WL 1661073 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2004). 
 96. Id. at *1. 
 97. Id. at *9. 
 98. Id. at *11. 
 99. Id. at *11. The court did not address plaintiff’s argument that she understood that she 
had no choice but to accept the non-financial terms. Id. at *10. 
 100. Id. at *11. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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lacks bargaining power, as she will be in most cases, other factors, 
including the negotiability of the waiver and the conspicuousness of 
the waiver, will also need to be carefully weighed and considered. 
This increases the complexity of the decision making process as well 
as the uncertainty of the ultimate outcome, making clear resolution of 
the burden question all the more crucial.105 A review of the opinions 
in Brown, Morris and Schappert, however, reveals that courts are still 
grappling with the proper allocation of the burden of proof when a 
party resists enforcement of a contractual jury waiver. Such 
inconsistencies make it difficult to predict whether a pre-dispute jury 
waiver will be enforced as shifting the burden of proof directly 
changes the nature of the inquiry. When the party resisting the waiver 
bears the burden of proof, as in Brown, a jury waiver can be upheld 
following only a superficial inquiry. In contrast, when the burden of 
proof is assigned to the party seeking to enforce the waiver, as in 
Morris and Schappert, the court conducts an exhaustive factual 
inquiry into the formation of the agreement before upholding a jury 
waiver. This unpredictability diminishes the potential value of such 
waivers. In order to encourage the appropriate use of pre-dispute jury 
waivers, courts must clarify the process through which they analyze 
such waivers, allocating the burden of proof in a way that takes into 
account public policy considerations as well as convenience and 
fairness concerns. 
IV. ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
Since most courts substantially agree on what information is 
relevant when determining whether a contractual waiver of a jury 
trial right was entered into knowingly and voluntarily,106 allocation of 
the burden of proof will often be determinative.  When the legislature 
is silent on the burden of proof, courts ordinarily allocate the burden 
 
 105. In contrast, many courts in commercial contract disputes have declined to squarely 
address the burden of proof issue when is it “clear” that the waiver is valid or invalid regardless 
of which party bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., Allyn v. Western United Life Assur. Co., 347 
F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1252 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (declining to address burden question because validity 
of waiver was clearly demonstrated by the facts); Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler 
Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 694, 707 (E.D. La. 1999) (“Because the court finds clear contractual 
waiver in this case, it need not determine whether the burden is on plaintiffs or defendants.”); 
Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (“Although this circuit 
has not decided which party bears the burden of proving the validity of an alleged waiver, it is 
clear in this case that Sevaux did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to a jury trial.”). 
 106. See supra note 57; LaRocca, supra note 3, at 944 & n.69. 
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to the party initiating the proceeding and seeking relief.107 But several 
factors such as public policy considerations, and convenience and 
fairness concerns, may support a different allocation of the burden.108 
A closer examination of pre-dispute contractual waivers against this 
backdrop suggests that a different allocation of the burden is 
warranted when such waivers are included in employment 
agreements. 
A. What is Actually Being Waived? 
A pre-dispute contractual jury waiver brings two basic societal 
interests into sharp relief: the right to a trial by jury and freedom of 
contract. “The resolution of civil disputes by jury is of historic and 
fundamental importance.”109 On the other hand, parties have the right 
to contract as they see fit as long as their agreement does not violate 
law or public policy.110 Accordingly, these two interests must be 
weighed against one another to determine the proper allocation of 
the burden of proof. As explained, infra, because pre-dispute jury 
waivers interfere with the role of the jury and our public system of 
dispute resolution, public policy considerations counsel against 
emphasizing private contractual autonomy over the right to a jury 
trial. 
 
 107. See Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S.Ct. 528, 538 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Congress has 
not explicitly addressed jury waivers in the employment context. See Matties, supra note 42, at 
443 (stating that no federal statute or rule specifically allows parties to waive their right to a jury 
trial by way of prelitigation contract); see also David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil 
Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in 
Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1114-1119 (2002) (characterizing the 
enforcement of jury waivers as a “judicial creation”). 
 108. Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 537-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, 
supra note 58, § 337, at 415. 
 109. Morris v. McFarland Clinic, P.C. , No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004 WL 306110, at *11 
(S.D. Iowa Jan. 29, 2004), at *11. For a discussion of the important purposes jury trials serve, see 
Matties, supra note 42, at 434-40. 
 110. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 148 S.W.3d 124, 129 &  n.11  (Tex. 2004); see, e.g., 
Am. Anglian Env. Tech., L.P. v. Env. Mgmt. Corp. 412 F.3d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that 
it is the policy of Missouri and nine other states “to give the maximum effect to the principle of 
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of operating agreements” and collecting statutes); 
Badgett v. Fed. Express Corp. 378 F. Supp. 2d 613, 622 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (noting the importance 
of the parties’ freedom of contract absent clear policy to the contrary); Allan Block Corp. v. E. 
Dillon & Co., No. Civ. 04-3511JNEJGL, 2005 WL 1593010, *8 (D. Minn. July 1, 2005) (citing 
Arrowhead Elec. Coop., Inc. v. LTV Steel Mining Co., 568 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1997)) (“Public policy ‘requires that freedom of contract shall remain inviolate, except only in 
cases which contravene public right or the public welfare.’”); see also Paul v. Davis 424 U.S. 693, 
722 n.10 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that the Constitution contains some 
protections of the right of the individual to contract); but see U.S. v. Antzoulatos 962 F.2d 720, 
725 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that any substantive due process right to contract “has been sharply 
curtailed”). 
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First, pre-dispute jury waivers impinge upon the role of the jury 
within our constitutional structure. The Seventh Amendment does 
not merely confer an individual jury-trial right, but also acts as a 
structural constraint on the power of the sovereign and the judge.111 
Indeed, some have called the jury “a primary check on judges’ 
power.”112 Thus, a jury waiver presents judges with the opportunity to 
substantially increase their own power by eliminating this check.  
The Supreme Court has recently highlighted the tension between 
a judge’s power, as opposed to the jury’s, in the criminal context.113 In 
U.S. v. Booker,114 the Court addressed the constitutionality of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”),115 observing that 
allowing judges to find facts that enhanced a defendant’s sentence 
impermissibly served to “increase the judge’s power and diminish that 
of the jury.”116 The Booker Court characterized its invalidation of the 
mandatory Guidelines as preserving the right of jury trial, thereby 
“guaranteeing that the jury would still stand between the individual 
and the power of the government.”117 
 Admittedly, waivers of constitutional rights are treated 
 
 111. Sternlight, supra note 25, at 672; Matties, supra note 42, at 439-40. In an impassioned 
concurrence to an opinion addressing pre-dispute arbitration clauses, Montana Supreme Court 
Justice Nelson stated: 
[T]he importance of the right of trial by jury derives from it having “developed in 
harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative 
government.” “Since the time of the Magna Carta, ‘trial by jury has been prized as a 
shield against oppression . . . [and] the approaches of arbitrary power.’” This 
entitlement has been “long thought to be a safeguard against tyranny.” The right to 
trial by jury is a “jealously protected safeguard against government oppression.” And, 
“[t]he guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and [Montana] State Constitutions reflect 
a profound judgment about the way in which the law should be enforced and justice 
administered.” 
Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 12 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted). 
 112. Matties, supra note 42, at 465. 
 113. U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005) (holding that a sentencing judge violates 
the Sixth Amendment by imposing an enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines based on the sentencing judge’s determination of a fact (other than a prior 
conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant). 
 114. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 115. Prior to Booker, the Guidelines were a mandatory determinate sentencing scheme 
applicable to federal crimes that decreed sentences within set sentencing ranges but further 
allowed a judge to enhance or depart from such ranges based on facts found by the judge. See id. 
at 233-37. 
 116. Id. at 235. 
 117. Id. at 236; see Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-06 (“[The right of jury trial] is 
no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional 
structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive 
branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”). 
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differently in the criminal context than in the civil context.118 This 
distinction has been criticized given that the Supreme Court has 
“never explained why constitutionally protected rights should be 
afforded any less protection in the civil context than in the criminal 
context.”119 While this Article does not urge the adoption of a criminal 
waiver standard, the Court’s pronouncements in the criminal context 
support the assertion that the jury plays an important role as a check 
on the judiciary and the sovereign. Placing the burden of proof on the 
party seeking enforcement of the waiver would therefore 
reemphasize the role of the jury as a limiting force on judicial 
discretion and power. 
Second, pre-dispute jury waivers undermine a party’s procedural 
right to a jury trial as enshrined within the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP). Specifically, FRCP 38(a) declares: “The right of 
trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the 
Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be 
preserved to the parties inviolate.”120 A party that wants a jury trial 
must demand one in accordance with FRCP 38; failure to do so 
constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury.121  FRCP 39(b) 
further allows the court discretion to order a trial by jury 
notwithstanding the failure of a party to properly demand a jury.122 
 
 118. See Ware, supra note 25, at 181-82. 
 119. Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference 
for Binding Arbitration, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 56-57 (1997). Professor Ware posits that one of the 
reasons that the Supreme Court is less protective of civil waivers is that such waivers are 
contractual and thus present less danger of overreaching and duress by the party seeking to 
enforce the waiver. See Ware, supra note 25, at 182 n. 88. This Article argues, however, that 
given the disparity in bargaining power and legal expertise between employer and employee, 
such a danger is often present in the employment context. See infra Part IV.B. 
 120. FED. RULE CIV. P. 38(a). 
 121. FED. RULE CIV. P. 38(d). It is important to note that the waiver provided for in Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 38(d), which occurs during litigation and is specifically authorized by 
the established rules of our procedural system, does not present the same problems as a pre-
dispute jury waiver. See infra, notes 133-36 and accompanying text; Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 
107, at 1104-07. As stated by the California Supreme Court: “the initiation of a lawsuit . . . 
focus[es] the attention of the litigants to produce a considered decision whether to demand —
and pay for — a jury trial based on an informed understanding of the stakes involved.” Grafton 
Partners L.P. v Super. Ct., 116 P.3d  479, 490 (Cal. 2005). Moreover, “[o]nce litigation 
commences and the time to demand a jury trial approaches, parties ordinarily have counsel and 
their decision whether to demand jury trial is likely to be a part of their litigation strategy.” Id.  
The Sixth Circuit observed that this rule “respecting timely demand for trial by jury is a 
reasonable requirement calculated to insure the orderly presentation of the business of the 
court.” K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 n.4 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 122. FED. RULE CIV. P. 38(b).  (“Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 
38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an 
action in which such a demand might have been made of right, the court in its discretion upon 
motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues.”); see John D. Perovich, Discretion of 
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Two of the main goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
were to establish national uniformity in procedure and to eliminate 
technical traps found in earlier procedural codes.123 These rules were 
the product of much debate and deliberation by public bodies,124 and 
are an integral part of a public system constructed to enable peaceful 
and orderly resolution of disputes. A pre-dispute jury waiver 
circumvents the rules by establishing a different set of procedures for 
the parties bound to it and arguably allows private parties to 
contractually limit the court’s discretion to order a trial by jury.125  
Enforcement of such a waiver thus defeats the goal of uniformity by 
allowing “privately tailored procedure for individual suits.”126 
Contractual jury waivers also favor those parties with the means 
and the ability to strategically exploit such waivers to their 
advantage;127 and in the context of employment agreements, that party 
is the employer.128 Therefore, these waivers not only impose 
procedures inconsistent with publicly-established ones, but fashion 
those procedures in such a way as to favor the same party nearly 
every time: the employer. 
A court that blindly espouses freedom of contract concerns when 
examining a pre-dispute jury waiver ignores the role of the jury as a 
check on the government’s power as well as the waiver’s 
encroachment upon our public dispute resolution system. This 
concern is especially acute when the system is disrupted in such a way 
as to consistently favor the same party. In recognition of society’s 
interest in a public dispute resolution system that is fundamentally 
fair and the disruptive effect of a jury waiver on the fairness of that 
system, the burden of proof should be placed on the party seeking to 
enforce the waiver. 
 
District Court Under Rule 39(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Authorizing it to Order Jury 
Trial Notwithstanding Party’s Failure to Make Seasonable Demand for Jury, 6 A.L.R. FED. 217 § 
4 (2005) (discussing extent of court’s discretion to order jury trial). 
 123. Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 107, at 1103; see also Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 602 (2005) (“The Rules, expressive of and coupled with an 
impressive investment in the infrastructure of the federal courts, represent a normative 
commitment to federal regulatory power.”). 
 124. Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 107, at 1100. 
 125. Once a pre-litigation agreement is found to be valid, “courts in near knee-jerk fashion 
provide automatic specific performance without acknowledging any necessity for first examining 
the prerequisites for specific performance or injunctive relief required for a ‘normal’ contract.’” 
Id. at 1127. 
 126. Id. at 1127. 
 127. Id. at 1103-04. 
 128. See infra, Part IV.B. 
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B. The Coercive Employer-Employee Relationship 
Employers possess distinct advantages over employees in both 
bargaining power and in their ability to assess the feasibility and the 
likely benefit of alternative dispute resolution methods. These 
advantages, as well as the risk of coercion inherent in the employer-
employee relationship, decrease the probability that knowing and 
voluntary consent to a jury waiver can be obtained. These 
considerations further support placing the burden of proof on the 
party seeking to enforce the pre-dispute jury waiver. 
Employment contracts “are susceptible to the presence of 
unconscionable terms,”129 because they are typically offered on a 
“take-it or leave-it” basis, drafted entirely by employers, and offered 
for employees to sign as a condition of employment.130 Most 
applicants lack bargaining power because rejecting the employment 
agreement is not a viable alternative.131 This dilemma discourages 
applicants from exercising any effort to understand what they are 
 
 129. Gooden v. Village Green Mgmt. Co., No. Civ. 02-835 (JRT/SRN), 2002 WL 31557689, 
at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2002) (noting that the “unique nature” of employment contracts 
“should subject them to special scrutiny”); see Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 107, at 1087 (noting 
that “there is a great opportunity for unfairness” when pre-litigation agreements are 
incorporated into employment agreements). 
 130. Gooden, 2002 WL 31557689, at *3; see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams 532 U.S. 105, 
139 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that many employees lack bargaining power); Daniel 
Roy, Note, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Union Workplace After Wright v. 
Universal Maritime Service Corp., 74 IND. L.J. 1347, 1360 (1999) (“When employees are 
presented with such form agreements, they are not ‘asked’ by their employers to accept, or 
make a counter-offer. They are instead required to accept, or look for another job.”); Steven 
Cherensky, Note, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment 
Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REV. 597, 621 (1993) (“Today, the majority 
of employment contracts are offered on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 
2000) (observing that “the economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-
after employees may be particularly acute” and that “few employees are in a position to refuse a 
job because of an arbitration requirement”); Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory 
Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV. 861, 871 (2004) (“In the end, the employee’s choice is between a job 
in which employment discrimination disputes are arbitrated and no job whatsoever. Such a 
choice is really no choice at all.”); William H. Daughtrey, Jr. & Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., 
Modifications Necessary for Commercial Arbitration Law to Protect Statutory Rights Against 
Discrimination in Employment: A Discussion and Proposals for Change, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 29, 72-73 (1998) (noting employees may lack the personal economic security and 
effective bargaining power to avoid unfavorable terms in employment agreements); Lucy T. 
France & Timothy C. Kelly, Mandatory Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims in the Workplace: No 
Enforceability Without Equivalency, 64 MONT. L. REV. 449, 463 (2003) (“Most employees lack 
bargaining power. Rarely do non-management level employees negotiate the terms of their 
employment at arms length.”); Reilly, supra note 25, at 1258-59 (arguing that efforts to find 
other jobs are curtailed by limited information and resources and by the view that jobs are a 
person’s most valuable possession and that meaningful choices between jobs assumes worker 
mobility and healthy job market). 
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waiving.132  
Even if an applicant wishes to carefully deliberate over the terms 
of the proffered employment agreement, and is granted the 
opportunity to do so, most lack the means to adequately evaluate the 
impact of a jury waiver. By definition, a pre-dispute jury waiver is 
presented and agreed to prior to litigation. Thus, at the time the right 
is waived, it is extremely difficult to anticipate the nature of the 
dispute that may arise from the agreement. Yet the nature of the 
dispute is a crucial factor when considering whether to ask for a jury 
trial.133 Cases with simple issues and good witnesses and which involve 
the potential for emotionally based damages are often the best in 
which to demand a jury.134 Complex cases, and those cases that rely 
heavily on legal issues, are poorer for jury treatment.135 The nature of 
the actual dispute also appreciably affects the cost-benefit analysis, as 
cases tried to a jury cost more than those tried to a judge.136 
Employers are “repeat players in the employment 
marketplace”137 and are more educated and skilled in legal matters 
than employees. Thus, they are more likely to take these concerns 
into account, given that they have better access to legal information, 
greater expertise with drafting and negotiating employment 
agreements, and more experience with taking cases to trial. 
Most employees, on the other hand, do not even think that 
sometime in the future they may become involved in legal disputes 
with their employers, let alone carefully weigh the ramifications of 
something as abstract as waiving their right to a jury trial in a case 
that has yet to be filed, regarding a dispute that has yet to 
materialize.138 Their ignorance of the law139 and other “cognitive 
biases”140 prevent employees from realizing the significance of what 
 
 132. Reilly, supra note 25, at 1235 (“A potential employee is unlikely to devote resources to 
try to understand something that he or she cannot change or escape.”). 
 133. Custis, supra note 15, at § 8:32. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Reilly, supra note 25, at 1236-37. 
 138. See id. at 1229-30 (noting that many employees dismiss the possibility of engaging in a 
dispute with their employers); see also Howard v. Bank South, N.A., 433 S.E.2d 625, 628 (Ga. 
App. 1993) (finding that since plaintiff could not have known when he signed the contract what 
the basis and circumstances of a future claim on that contract might be, his waiver of jury trial 
could not have been knowing and voluntary). 
 139. Reilly, supra note 25, at 1225 (“Most employees have little knowledge of their legal 
rights in employment.”). 
 140. Some cognitive biases include a systematic underestimation of risk and the use of a 
small sample of positive or neutral interactions as reliable predictors of the relationship in the 
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they are agreeing to. Therefore, at the time the waiver is entered into, 
most employees have not adequately considered the consequences of 
waiving their right to a jury. 
This disparity in power, expertise and resources creates a two-
fold problem for employees. The employer’s greater expertise and 
resources produces employment agreements that are naturally 
drafted in terms that favor the employer. This means that the 
employer determines whether or not a jury waiver provision will be 
inserted into the employment agreement in the first instance. And 
since employees are in the unenviable position of having neither 
bargaining power nor legal expertise, these employment agreements, 
which already heavily favor the employer, are rarely negotiated. 
Consequently, employment agreements, and jury waivers in 
particular, are entered into with little deliberation by the employee, 
despite the evident biases against them. 
Clearly, the employer’s resources and expertise make it better 
able to demonstrate that a pre-dispute jury waiver was entered into 
knowingly and voluntarily. However, this is not the only reason it 
should bear the burden of proof.141 A frequent significant 
consideration in the allocation of the burden of proof is the judicial 
estimate of the probabilities of the situation.142 That is, “it is usually 
fairer to act as if the exceptional situation did not exist and therefore 
to place the burden of proof and persuasion on the party claiming its 
existence.”143 With respect to pre-dispute jury waivers entered into 
between employers and employees, knowing and voluntary consent 
to such a waiver would be exceptional, given the employer’s natural 
advantages in light of the employee’s natural disadvantages, and the 
likelihood of bias and coercion. As an example, consider Elizabeth, 
the hypothetical employee presented at the beginning of this Article. 
Elizabeth has only a high school education and applied for an entry-
level job with a large corporation. Her education level, the complexity 
of the legal right being waived, and the large number of potential 
applicants qualified for that same position make it highly unlikely that 
her employer invested the time required to ensure that Elizabeth’s 
 
future.  Id. at 1228-34. 
 141. See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005) 
(noting that courts “do not automatically assign the burden of proof to the side with the bigger 
guns”). 
 142. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 58, § 337. 
 143. Id. 
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waiver was knowing and voluntary.144 This probability, coupled with 
the employer’s superior access to legal information and greater 
resources, warrant assigning the burden to the employer. 
C. Assigning the Burden of Proof 
Allocating the burden of proof to the party seeking enforcement 
of the waiver strikes the appropriate balance between freedom of 
contract and the right to a jury trial.145 First, employment agreements 
are uniquely susceptible to unfair terms. Second, the parties to those 
agreements differ greatly with respect to their bargaining power and 
legal sophistication. Third, it is more likely than not that a jury waiver 
will not be entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Fourth, pre-
dispute jury waivers diminish the role of the jury and circumvent our 
public dispute resolution system. Thus, sound public policy, 
convenience and fairness concerns all establish that the burden of 
demonstrating that a jury waiver was voluntary and knowing is 
 
 144. But it is not unheard of. In Gentry v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790 (Cal. App., 
rev. granted and depublished, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 5122 (Cal. Apr. 26, 2006), the employer provided 
a dispute resolution packet to its workers pursuant to which employees were afforded various 
options, including arbitration, for resolving employment-related disputes and given thirty days 
to opt out of the arbitration agreement. Id. at 791-92. The employer also provided employees 
with a handbook that pointed out both the advantages and disadvantages of electing arbitration. 
Id. at 794. The Gentry court found that such an arbitration agreement was not adhesive and was 
not unconscionable. Id. at 793-94; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 
1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (arbitration agreement was not unconscionable because employee was 
given thirty days to decide whether to participate in the program, the terms of the arbitration 
agreement were “clearly spelled out” in written materials and a video tape presentation, and 
employee was encouraged to contact employer’s representatives or to consult an attorney prior 
to deciding whether to participate in the program). Since review has been granted in Gentry, its  
holding is questionable; however, materials and procedures similar to those implemented by the 
employer in Gentry could conceivably be used to increase the likelihood that an employee’s 
waiver of her right to a jury trial is knowing and voluntary. 
 145. But see Joel Andersen, Note, The Indulgence of Reasonable Presumptions: Federal 
Court Contractual Civil Jury Trial Waivers, 102 MICH. L. REV. 104, 112 & n.50 (2003). Andersen 
advocates for the use of a permissive presumption in cases involving pre-dispute jury waivers. 
Id. at 111. Using the permissive presumption, if a party claims her waiver was not knowing and 
voluntary then the court may find that there was no waiver even if her claim is the only 
evidence. Id. at 116-17. However, the court may still find against the party resisting enforcement 
of the waiver if the evidence is “weak.” Id. at 117. Andersen argues that this presumption 
protects the right to a jury trial and the contractual interests of the parties while leaving intact 
the “normal mechanisms found in an ordinary contract dispute.” Id. According to Anderson, 
shifting the burden of production and persuasion to the party seeking to enforce the waiver does 
not adequately protect freedom of contract. Id. at 116 n.86. But, as argued in this Article, in the 
context of employment agreements, society’s interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by 
the right to a jury trial. Furthermore, convenience and fairness concerns warrant assigning the 
burden of proof to the party with greater expertise and resources, and the party claiming the 
existence of an unlikely situation, which in most cases is an employer seeking enforcement of a 
pre-dispute jury waiver. 
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properly placed on the proponent of the waiver.146 
Applying this allocation to the Brown case147 demonstrates how 
significantly it can affect the outcome. In Brown, plaintiff claimed 
that her waiver was not knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, her 
employer must persuade the court that plaintiff’s waiver was knowing 
and voluntary in light of the following factors: (1) negotiability of the 
contract terms; (2) conspicuousness of the waiver provision; (3) the 
relative bargaining power of the parties; and (4) the business acumen 
of the party opposing the waiver. The employer presents evidence 
that the waiver was conspicuous and that plaintiff had an M.B.A. 
from Harvard and was formerly employed as an investment banker. 
No evidence is presented regarding the negotiability of the contract 
terms or the relative bargaining power of the parties. Plaintiff 
presents evidence that she did not even read the waiver before 
signing it. Because the burden of proof is on the employer, failure to 
present any evidence to suggest that the contract terms were 
negotiable and/or that the plaintiff had some modicum of bargaining 
power means that the employer has not satisfied its burden. In light of 
the evidence presented, the court would clearly find that the 
employer failed to meet its burden and would disregard the waiver. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Bench trials offer distinct advantages over arbitration and jury 
trials. But as parties attempt to leverage these advantages by using 
pre-dispute contractual jury waivers to manage litigation risk and 
 
 146. This is not the approach the courts take with mandatory employment arbitration, even 
though an agreement to arbitrate includes a waiver of jury trial rights. See Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also Sternlight, supra note 25, at 695-96. 
Courts have generally held that the opponent of an arbitration clause bears the burden of 
showing that the clause is inconsistent with federal law or invalid as a matter of contract law.  Id. 
at 707-08. Courts have supported their more lenient treatment of mandatory arbitration by 
citing the federal policy favoring arbitration contained in the Federal Arbitration Act. See 
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25; see also Sternlight, supra note 25, at 696. But there is no comparable 
federal policy favoring bench trials over jury trials. This Article argues that the Constitution and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure evidence a policy favoring jury trials over bench trials. See 
supra Part IV.A. Accordingly, in this respect, the judicial treatment of arbitration agreements is 
not relevant. Indeed, the California Supreme Court relied on a similar rationale to explain its 
decision to recognize arbitration agreements while striking down pre-dispute jury waivers. 
Grafton Partners L.P. v. Super. Ct., 116 P.3d 479, 480 (Cal. 2005) (noting the strong state policy 
favoring arbitration, the absence of any state policy favoring court trials and a “long standing 
public policy in favor of trial by jury”). The Grafton court went on to state that it is rational to 
promote pre-dispute arbitration agreements “while not according the same advantage to jury 
trial waivers” because arbitration “conserves judicial resources far more than the selection of a 
court trial over a jury trial.” Id. 
 147. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. 
CHUANG ARTICLE 6/30/2006  1:04:22 PM 
232 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 10:205 
cost, it is important to clarify judicial enforcement of such waivers to 
encourage their thoughtful and appropriate use. This Article argues 
that public policy considerations, coupled with convenience and 
fairness concerns, call for assigning the burden of proving the validity 
of a pre-dispute contractual jury waiver to the party seeking 
enforcement of the waiver. By assigning the burden of proof in this 
way, courts can ensure that such waivers are treated consistently. 
Consistent judicial treatment of pre-dispute contractual waivers will, 
in turn, allow such waivers to be used appropriately. 
 
